“A recipe for thought”. •. •. Fred Dretske a sketch of a “naturalistic” account of intentional mental states (a “psychosemantics”). “Thought may be intentional. View Notes – dretske from PHIL at University Of Arizona. Fred Dretske A recipe for thought Phil/Psyc Fall How do you build a thinking thing?. A question about Dretske’s idea that intentionality can be located in things outside of the mind — such as compasses, thermometers, and even.
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No arrangement of matter, it would seem, could be intentional because we could take an image of that arrangement, and, despite the fact that the image preserves all the relevant information, the image would not have intentionality.
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Fred Dretske, A Recipe for Thought – PhilPapers
In contrast, when a person sees a dog their experience is about the dog no matter who or what else exists in the world, and fro in an important sense this about-ness, which we call intentionality, is more important. Gordon Giles – – Philosophy Now As far as the recipee of the mind is concerned the cause of P is irrelevant in the sense that the mind will have the same sequence of states, and the same consciousness, regardless of whether P at a particular moment is caused by C or by something else.
A Recipe for Thought
My perception of the cat may be precise or imprecise, my belief that it is going to recip may be accurate or inaccurate and my desire to be loved may be satisfied or unsatisfied. Of course behavior is how we usually determine whether a system has intentionality, since it is what we can most easily observe, but internal changes thoughts also count, as mentioned above, and so it is possible that some completely immobile systems have intentionality, although we might never know it.
However, even Dretske asserts that bodily sensations are mental perceptions and therefore are intentional Byrne n. Chalmers, D J ed. Sign in Create an account. Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind Physicalism in Metaphysics categorize this paper. This claim can be amended to original intentionality is sufficient for mentality, thereby making the claim have some chance of validity Byrne n.
Trackback URL janetthomas says: Are intentional mental states simply physical states? Civil Society and its Discontents: This entry has no external links. This claim was derived from the thesis of the nineteenth century philosopher Franz Brentano in his book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
Most significantly we have thoughts thokght external objects that are about them, but these thoughts are not caused directly by those objects. Classical and Contemporary Reading, D. The thoughts about that monster are further intentional states, however the language that the subject speaks about the dretsks or the painting that the subject does of the monster are not.
To remedy this we add the criterion that not only must P usually be caused by C but that P must cause the system to act including thought-acts as if C.
With his assessment of intentional inexistence, Brentano Byrne n. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.
mental_content [Philosophy of Mind]
Gendered Metaphors for Genetic Medicine. Fernando Birman – – Disputatio 3 Fortunately, the account we have been developing requires only a small change to account for this. Therefore, we have intentional phenomena the compass with an intensional context its use or purpose and that this intensionality is as much a part dretsle the intentional phenomena as its original intentionality.
Find it on Scholar. Bart Geurts – – Cambridge University Press. Dretske also maintains a causal theory of intentionality such that mental states represent something, like tree rings represent something, and argues that the intentionality of mental states can be reduced to their evolutionary biological function.
History of Western Philosophy. Finally I should probably mention that this account of intentionality is not a form of externalism although Dretske does develop his theory into an externalist account. dretsme
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: For Dretskep. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use. They have no physical determining factor. The Nature of Thought. It is the derived power of such objects to misrepresent that Dretskep. Reblogged this on janetthomas. However, Chisholm statesp. For Chisholm intentionality cannot be naturalized because no such psychological fact can be identified with a physical fact.
March 26, at 3: You are commenting using your WordPress. This essay will explore the claims made by Chisholm and Dretske and ascertain the validity of their arguments as to whether the all the contents of the mind are physical or mental states.
National Health Service and other mental illnesses that have dire physical effects are examples of such intentional mental states. You are commenting using your Facebook account.